



# In insensitive Munitions Technology: Career Reflections and International Perspective

## Fulmination 2022

Dr. Ernie Baker

Warheads Technology TSO

[e.baker@msiac.nato.int](mailto:e.baker@msiac.nato.int)



- My Career
- NATO MSIAC
- IM: US vs. International Policy
- NATO IM Test Standard Update
- IM Success Examples
- Harmonization of IM and Safety
- Technology Gaps
- Conclusion


## NATO Munitions Safety Information and Analysis Center (MSIAC)

- 1 June 2016
- Technology Specialist Officer for Warheads
- Support the 15 MSIAC member nations

## US Army Armament Research, Development and Engineering Center

- Retired May 31 2016 after 31 years
- Senior Research Scientist (ST) for Insensitive Munitions
- Support the US DoD, Army and ARDEC

Strong interest in energetic materials from a young age



I hugely benefited through technical interactions

- ARDEC
- DoD (JIMTP)
- DOE (JMP)
- Industry
- Academia
- International



Technical interaction outside of your organization is vital for both personal and technical community development

I am a product of the technical community

History of NIMIC/MSIAC is linked to history of IM

- Need arose from horrific accidents of 1960 and 1970s



## HORRIFIC MUNITION ACCIDENTS NATIONS RECOGNIZE NEED TO REDUCE DANGER TO OUR OWN FORCES

RFA Bedenham accidental  
detonation of depth charges  
13 killed

1951

1960

USS Forrestal  
accidental  
ignition of  
a Zuni rocket  
134 killed,  
161 injured

1967

1969

USS Enterprise accidental  
cook-off of a Zuni rocket  
28 killed, 344 injured

1970

Roseville, CA Railyard accidental  
cook-off of MK-81 bombs  
48 injured

1973




## Technical Information & Analysis Center Focusing on Munitions Safety

- NATO Project Office
- Independently Funded by its Member Nations

### MSIAC Strategic Goal:

***Eliminate Hazardous Consequences due to Unintended Reactions of Munitions and Energetic Materials Throughout their Lifecycle***




Knowledge & Access to Community of Technical Experts Across our Member Nations



- Want to minimize the risk from our own munitions
- Understand and demonstrate benefits of munitions safety throughout the lifecycle
- Improve and standardize munitions safety risk assessment methodologies
  - better understanding of benefits and relative costs of munitions safety measures and methods
- Harmonize munitions safety policies to achieve greater sharing of munitions safety evidence
- Provide world leading scientific and technical analysis, and advice to support decisions on munitions safety and risk management
- Standardize approach to safe storage and use of munitions in operational theatres

## US DoD Insensitive Munitions: MIL-STD-2105D

- Refers to NATO Standards (STANAGs)
  - STANAG 4240: Fast Cook-Off (FCO), in a fire
  - STANAG 4382: Slow Cook-Off (SCO), near a fire
  - STANAG 4241: Bullet Impact (BI), rifle attack
  - STANAG 4496: Fragment Impact (FI), mortar or artillery attack
  - STANAG 4396: Sympathetic Reaction (SR), prevent mass detonation
  - STANAG 4526: Shaped Charge Jet Impact (SCJI), RPG attack




## International

- NATO: Policy for Introduction and Assessment of Insensitive Munitions (IM), STANAG 4439 covering AOP-39 Edition D Version 1 (20 Nov 2018)
  - *All NATO IM policy and test standards have been recently updated!*
- However different countries have different national policies
- Several NATO and some MSIAC countries do not have national IM policies

- Last coordinated publication of IM Test STANAGs April 2003
- STANAG 4439 revised twice since last Test STANAG
  - Resulting inconsistencies
- Changing organization and structures
- Opportunity with transition of Test STANAGs to AOPs

*AC/326, SG/B*

## NATO IM STANAG Timeline



*All documents updated!*

- Test procedures – *Modified*
  - Procedure 1: Large pool fire
  - Procedure 2: Mini pool fire
  - Procedure 3: Fuel burner fire
- Thermocouples – *Modified*
  - Minimum 6 TC: (40-60 mm) fore, aft, starboard, port, above and below
- Conformity – *Modified*
  - Taverage > 800°C measured by all TC
  - 550°C under 30 s measured by all TC

**NEW**



## ■ Test procedures – *Modified*


- Procedure 1: Preconditioning at  $50 \pm 3^\circ\text{C}$  until thermal equilibrium of the test item, then Heating Rate  $15^\circ\text{C/hr}$  until reaction occurs
- Procedure 2: Another HR determined by THA
- Procedure 3 (UN HC):  $3.3^\circ\text{C/hr}$  until reaction occurs – possibility to precondition at  $T_{\text{reaction}} - 55^\circ\text{C}$  (estimated)

## ■ Thermocouples – *Modified*

- 6 required TC at 40-60 mm around the test item, rather than 4

**NEW**

## ■ Annex A: Methods to estimate the soak time at $50^\circ\text{C}$



## ■ Test procedures – *Modified*

**NEW**

- Procedure 1: 3 12.7 mm AP M2 projectiles at  $850 \pm 20$  m/s ( $600 \pm 50$  rounds/min)
- Procedure 2: 1 12.7 mm AP M2 projectile at  $850 \pm 20$  m/s
- Procedure 3: 1 or several projectiles – projectile and velocity determined by THA

**NEW**

- Annex A: Recommendations aiming point and target area
- Annex B: Specifications 12.7 mm AP projectiles




■ **Test procedures – *Unchanged***

- Procedure 1: 2530 +/- 90 m/s
- Procedure 2: 1830 +/- 60 m/s


**NEW**

■ **Accuracy at impact (approved by National Authorities)**

$\varnothing = ?$




Small items: Hit the targeted area



**NEW**

■ **Orientation of the fragment at impact**

- Recommendation  $\pm 10^\circ$



■ **Brinell Hardness of the fragment – *Modified***

- **190** < HB < **270**

## ■ Test methods (donor initiation)

- If designed to detonate, detonate the donor munition in the design mode – **Unchanged**
- For munitions which are not designed to detonate, initiate the donor munition(s) with a credible threat that produces a worst-case response (for example, shaped charge jet) – **Modified**
- Sand not to be used for inert munitions or confinement – **Modified**

## ■ **Baseline test:** recommendation to perform a baseline test in order to determine the blast, fragmentation and penetration signature of the donor test item(s), and the fragmentation and spatial distribution of inert acceptors.

**NEW**


## ■ Additions in SRD AOP-39.1

- SR configuration examples
- Clarification of what is the test item in SR tests

**NEW**

## ■ Addition of definitions for donor/acceptor munition in official NATO terminology

**NEW**





**NEW**

## ■ Test procedures – *Modified*

- Procedure 1: SCJ characteristic of RPG-7 (Rocket Propelled Grenade)\*
- Procedure 2: SCJ supported by means of a THA


**NEW**

## ■ Characterization of the SCJ

- $V^2d$  at the target between 120 and 140 mm<sup>3</sup>/μs<sup>2</sup>
- Jet diameter between 2.5 and 3.5 mm

Previous: STANAG: Rockeye 50 mm

New: SC 81 mm LX-14 (USA); France : CCEB62



## Performance Comparisons

- Matches TNT Performance

	Conventional	IMX-101
Formulation	TNT	DNAN/NTQ/NQ
Density	1.65	1.75
VoD	6960	6960
Gurney Velocity	2300	2300




Type IV  
response to SCJ



## IM Technology

- IM High Explosive: IMX-101 with Large Critical Diameter (66mm)
- Supplementary charge
- Not fuzed – Meltable fuze lifting plug adaptor



## IM Benefits (cost analysis)

- Melt Cast Formulation
- Choice of EM results in small cost increase per unit round

## IM Signature


	FCO	SCO	BI	FI	SR	SCJ
M795 (TNT)	III	III	IV	IV	I	I
M795 (IMX-101)	V	V	IV	V	Pass	IV

## Customers

- U.S. Army, U.S. Marine Corps

## Performance Comparisons

- Dual purpose torpedo
- Relative Bubble Energy




## Customers

- French Navy

## IM Technology

- EIS High Explosive: 250 Kg B-2211D (PBX)
- AP/Al/I-RDX®/HTPB (43/25/20/12)
- Thermal Protection and Fuze Varnish
  - Delayed ignition for fire fighting
  - Controlled ignition due to fuze varnish



## IM Benefits (cost analysis)

- Heavy Torpedo Unit Cost: >US\$ 2.5M
- Low Cost Ingredients, WH HE cost < 1% total torpedo cost


## IM Signature

	FCO	SCO	BI	FI	SR	SCJ
HBX/Torpex	Red	Red	Red	Red	>III	Red
TP-2000	V	IV	V	V	III	IV

\*Specific stowage configuration (head to tail) and a metal protection plate

## Performance Comparisons

- All western countries precision-guided cruise missiles are IM to a certain extent and used similar HE formulations (PBXN-109 type)



## Customers

- France
- Greece
- Italy
- UK

## IM Technology

- High Explosives:
  - PBXN-110 (Precursor Charge)
  - PBXN-109 (Follow-Through Bomb)
- Booster Explosive: Rowanex 3601
- Logistic Container

## IM Benefits (cost analysis)

- UK Not Relevant as this family of large penetrator missiles is IM only
- MoD classified as NATO 1.2.3


## IM Signature

	FCO	SCO	BI	FI	SR
Mk-83	I	I	I	I	I
BLU-110	IV/V	IV/V	V	V	I
Storm Shadow	V	V	V	V*	IV**

\* By analysis, \*\* In logistics container

Ongoing working group (WG) to investigate further harmonizing IM and hazard classification (HC) testing and assignment procedures.

- Working to combine STANAG 4439 & AOP-39 with STANAG 4123 & AASTP-3.
- Harmonize IM and HC testing beyond NATO: Use UN test series 7 for hazard division 1.6 (rarely used)



## What keeps me up at night?



- Cook-off and sympathetic reaction
  - Large bomb sympathetic reaction: been working this issue for over 25 years
  - Rocket motors: introduction of reduced response rocket motors has been difficult
- Medium caliber explosives: small critical diameter, reduced sensitivity and cost effective
- Is gap test data reliable and predictive? **NATO working group formed in 2019!**
- Large caliber gun launch of new energetic materials: lack of ignition understanding and physics based fill acceptance criteria: How does laboratory setback testing relate to actual gun launch? **NATO working group formed in 2017!**
- Slow cook-off rate: Are we working a problem that doesn't exist? At what cost? **Issue resolved: NATO working group resulted in an updated STANAG!**



Fatal explosion occurred on 12 June 2006 killing two.  
Justin Friedrichsen (24) , Steven Upton (48)

*In sensitive Munitions saves lives!*



SPC Ng visits US Army PEO Ammunition on 5 OCT 2009



MRAP exterior view



MRAP interior view



Collected unexploded shell bodies and separated fuzes

12 SEP 2009: Specialist Ng was travelling in a Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicle when it was hit by a very powerful Improvised Explosive Device (IED). The IED ruptured the vehicle's hull and fuel tank, which engulfed the vehicle interior in flames-to include sixteen M768 60mm mortar cartridges that were carried inside the cabin with the seven-man crew. Although several soldiers were seriously injured in the ambush, all survived. Specialist Ng credited the In sensitive Munitions (IM) features of the M768 cartridges with averting a much greater disaster.



# Questions?

